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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider you are an attorney practicing medical malpractice law in
Nebraska and a potential client confronts you with the following sce-
nario. Herbie Husker, the strong-armed quarterback for the Univer-
sity of Nebraska football team, visited his doctor about pain in his left
arm. The doctor examined him, took x-rays, and diagnosed a torn
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw RmEw.
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tricep, which was attributed to throwing the football too often. The
doctor prescribed pain medication and advised Herbie to reduce his
practice schedule. Six months later, after successfully leading Ne-
braska to its fifth national championship, Herbie was still suffering
from pain in his left arm, which now had spread to his elbow. On the
advice of his coach, he returned to see his doctor. This time, she diag-
nosed cancer.
Herbie's initial chance of survival with timely diagnosis of the can-
cer would have been 50%. Because of the delay in diagnosing the can-
cer, however, several experts agreed that the delay resulted in a
diminished 40% chance of survival. Furthermore, the experts testified
that they would have conducted additional tests during Herbie's ini-
tial visit, which is customary in the local medical community.
Herbie Husker now needs your advice. Although the standard of
care was breached and the doctor's failure to timely diagnose the can-
cer was a direct cause of the loss of chance of survival, the question
remains whether or not Herbie Husker can recover damages for his
loss of chance of survival under Nebraska medical malpractice law.
The foregoing hypothetical represents a typical loss of chance tort
cause of action in which a patient's initial chance of avoiding harm
was "not better than even," and the patient suffered a reduction in
that initial chance due to negligent medical care. At first glance, it
appears that Nebraska does not recognize the loss of chance cause of
action according to Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc. I Yet, upon fur-
ther analysis, Steineke may support the adoption of loss of chance
either as a cause of action or as an element of damages. Outside of
Nebraska, a decreasing majority of jurisdictions still deny recovery to
patients when their initial chance of avoiding harm was lower than
51%.2 Courts justify this position because the patient is unable to
demonstrate with reasonable medical certainty3 that but for the negli-
1. 246 Neb. 374, 518 N.W.2d 904 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986); Abille v. United States,
482 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(applying Alaska law); Murdoch v. Thomas, 404
So. 2d 580 (Ala. 1981); Morgenroth v. Pacific Med. Ctr., Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 681
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015
(Fla. 1984); Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. 1975); Watson v. Medi-
cal Emergency Servs. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Walden v.
Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1968); Fennell v. Southern Med. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580
A.2d 206 (Md. 1990); Wright v. Clement, 190 N.E. 11 (Mass. 1934); Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980); Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439
(Miss. 1985); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992); Pills-
bury-Flood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 512 A.2d 1126 (N.H. 1986); Schenck v. Roger
Williams Gen. Hosp., 382 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1977); Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371
(S.C. 1995); Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1993); Kramer v. Lewis-
ville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993); Blondel v. Hayes, 403 S.E.2d 340
(Va. 1991).
3. The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" means more than a 50% chance.
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gence, the harm could have been avoided. The recent trend, however,
has been to allow patients recovery for any loss of chance, regardless
of their initial chance.4
This Note first chronicles the development of loss of chance in med-
ical malpractice litigation by focusing on the various approaches used
by jurisdictions that recognize the cause of action. Second, this Note
analyzes the Nebraska Supreme Court's position on whether or not to
recognize loss of chance either as a cause of action or as an element of
damages. Finally, this Note examines the valuation of damages and
analyzes the policy considerations for adopting loss of chance in a
medical malpractice legal regime.
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE
Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc. emits strong support for adopt-
ing loss of chance either as a cause of action or as an element of tort
damages. Yet, because the Nebraska Supreme Court has not adopted
loss of chance explicitly, understanding how loss of chance developed
is necessary to analyze its current status and its future impact on Ne-
braska medical malpractice cases. Therefore, this section will lay out
the traditional tort law principles and discuss how loss of chance fits
within that framework, followed by a cursory overview of the various
approaches used to allow recovery for loss of chance.
A. Traditional Tort Law Principles: All-Or-Nothing
Approach
The typical medical malpractice case is a tort action in negligence.5
Under common law negligence principles, a plaintiff must prove four
elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defend-
ant breached that duty; (3) the defendant's breach was both the legal
cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (4)
the plaintiff suffered some injury.6 In loss of chance cases, the ele-
ment of causation is the most difficult to prove. The traditional tort
model requires the plaintiff to prove causation by a preponderance of
4. See, e.g., Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Kan. 1989); Thompson v.
Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984)(adopted in part);
DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986); Hastings v. Baton
Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713 (La. 1986); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462
N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991);
Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); McK-
ellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987)(adopted in part).
5. Robert S. Bruer, Loss of a Chance as a Cause of Action in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 59 Mo. L. REv. 969, 971 (1994).
6. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
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the evidence.7 Under this standard, a plaintiff must prove that it is
more likely than not that the defendant's negligence caused the pa-
tient's injury.8
The all-or-nothing approach to loss of chance falls within the tradi-
tional concepts of tort law. 9 Jones v. OwingslO is representative of
cases upholding the traditional tort model in causes of action involv-
ing loss of chance. In Jones, prior to the patient's treatment for a frac-
tured left femur, the doctor administered a preoperative chest x-ray."
The radiology report from that x-ray noted abnormality in the upper
left lung, and follow-up procedures were recommended.' 2 Almost one
year later, the radiologist took another preoperative x-ray. This time
the radiology report specifically noted "probable scaring [of the] left
upper lobe" and again recommended follow-up procedures.1S Despite
the recommendation, the patient's doctor took no action. Thereafter
the patient was diagnosed with lung cancer and later died as a
result.14
A wrongful death action was instituted by the patient's estate, al-
leging negligence by the doctor in falling to follow up on the radiolo-
gists' reports or informing the patient of the report
recommendations.l 5 At trial, expert testimony established that even
with timely diagnosis after the initial x-ray, the patient's chance of
survival was only approximately 50%.16 By the time the cancer was
discovered by the doctor, the patient's chance of survival was 20% to
25%.17
The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the plaintiffs recov-
ery, choosing instead to maintain the traditional approach. The court
reasoned that "to comport with the standard of proof of proximate
cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case must prove that defendant's neg-
ligence, in probability, proximately caused the death."18 The court de-
termined that to allow recovery without establishing but for causation
would be "contrary to the most basic standards of proof which under-
7. Id. § 41, at 269.
8. Id.
9. See Joseph H. King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353
(1981).
10. 456 S.E.2d 371 (S.C. 1995).
11. Id. at 372.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 373-74 (citing Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971),
overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio
1996)).
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gird the tort system."'19 In other words, even though there is approxi-
mately a 50% chance that the doctor caused the patient's ultimate
injury, if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that there was at least a 51% chance that the doctor caused
the his harm, the negligent doctor triumphs.20 But if the plaintiff can
establish the requisite 51% chance that the doctor's actions caused the
patient's harm, the patient prevails even though there is a 49% chance
that the doctor did not cause the patient's ultimate injury.
2 1
In the typical loss of chance case, as in Jones, the patient has less
than a 50% chance of survival prior to treatment. So even with proper
medical treatment, the patient would die. Therefore, the doctor's neg-
ligence is not the cause-in-fact (i.e., but for) of the patient's death. Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff can never prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant's negligence is a cause-in-fact of the in-
jury, and, as in Jones, is denied recovery for his injury. This has led
courts to create ways to circumvent the traditional tort rules to pre-
vent the perceived injustice of the but for test.
22
B. Evolution of Loss of Chance
The all-or-nothing approach is the traditional rule that denies re-
covery for a patient who had a less than 51% chance of survival prior
to the alleged negligence.23 This rule operates regardless of the dimi-
nution in chance caused by the doctor's negligence. This approach
represents the diminishing majority view24 mainly because of its sim-
plicity and "rough justice."
25
More recently, many jurisdictions have turned to the King ap-
proach, which compensates the plaintiff for the percentage of harm
actually caused by the negligent doctor.2 6 In addition, two other ap-
proaches have evolved that allow recovery for loss of chance based on
a relaxed causation standard. Under one approach, if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the defendant's negligence deprived the patient of a
19. Id. at 374. The court was persuaded by reasoning found in Kilpatrick v. Bryant,
868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993), and concluded that "the loss of chance theory
of recovery is fundamentally at odds with the requisite degree of medical certi-
tude necessary to establish a causal link between the injury of a patient and the
tortious conduct of a physician." Id.
20. Lori R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance As Technique: Toeing the Line at Fifty Percent,
72 TEX. L. Ray. 369, 384 (1993).
21. Id. at 383-84.
22. Id. at 383.
23. See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
24. Michael J. Fox, The Loss of Chance Doctrine in Medical Malpractice, 33 A.F. L.
REy. 97, 98 (1990).
25. Jack Rosati, Causation in Medical Malpractice: A Modified Valuation Approach,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 471 (1989).
26. See cases cited supra note 4.
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substantial chance of survival, 27 then the plaintiff recovers 100% of
the damages. This currently is the minority view2s because, as one
commentator put it, "[iut is difficult to determine whether this ap-
proach is really a restatement of the all-or-nothing approach or if the
courts are willing to compensate any loss."29 The second approach,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323(a), has been used by a
few jurisdictions, which allows the plaintiff to recover for any in-
creased risk of harm caused by the defendant's negligence. 30
1. King Approach
The fairest and most equitable of all loss of chance theories is the
King approach. This approach compensates for the loss of chance re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff had a 99% chance of survival or a 1%
chance of survival at the time the negligent diagnosis was made.31
Further, a plaintiff can recover whether or not death results after the
negligent diagnosis. According to Professor King, courts should ac-
knowledge injuries beyond just the plaintiffs death because
even if the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the loss of a chance of com-
pletely avoiding some specific harm, such as cancer-induced death, he might
still be entitled to recover for the loss of a chance to slow the course of the
disease or to mitigate its painful effects.
3 2
A concurring opinion in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative3 3
first contemplated the King approach, but Iowa was the first state to
completely adopt it.34 In DeBurkarte v. Louvar,35 the Iowa Supreme
Court analyzed a medical malpractice case in which the doctor's mis-
diagnosis of the plaintiffs condition resulted in the systemic spread of
27. See, e.g., Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Richmond County Hosp.
Auth. v. Dickerson, 356 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Aasheim v. Humberger,
695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467
(Okla. 1985); Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem'l Hosp., 169 S.E.2d 563 (Va. 1969);
Thorton v. CAMC, Etc., 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1983); Eblinger v. Sipes, 454
N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).
28. Rosati, supra note 25, at 472.
29. Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance of Survival Doctrine: Should the Courts Ever
Tinker with Chance?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 421, 431 (1992).
30. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz.
1984); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Roberson v. Counselman,
686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984), overruled by Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan.
1994); Scafidi v. Seller, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente
Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996)(adopted in part); Hamil v.
Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d
474 (Wash. 1983)(en banc).
31. King, supra note 9.
32. Id. at 1373.
33. 664 P.2d 474, 481 (Wash. 1983)(Pearson, J., concurring).
34. Boggs, supra note 29, at 437.
35. 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
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breast cancer.36 The plaintiff sued the doctor, alleging that his failure
to diagnose her cancer when removal of the cancerous tissue could
have arrested it caused her to lose a chance of survival.37 In adopting
the King approach, the Iowa Supreme Court allowed recovery for the
lost chance.38 The court reasoned that it was better to recognize loss
of chance as a recoverable injury than to deny a plaintiff recovery
under the all or nothing approach.39 The court stated that "[a]llowing
recovery for the lost chance is the most equitable approach because
'but for the defendant's tortious conduct, it would not have been neces-
sary to grapple with the imponderables of chance." 40
Professor King's approach leaves untouched traditional tort law
principles of causation. The approach requires courts to recognize a
tort action and to award damages for the patient's loss of chance of
survival.4i By recognizing loss of chance as a tort action, the patient
need prove only that the doctor was a proximate cause of the loss of
chance,42 rather than a proximate cause of the patient's death. As a
result, negligent doctors are liable only for the resulting loss of
chance.43
2. Loss of Substantial Chance of Survival
The substantial chance approach has been adopted by only a mi-
nority of jurisdictions. 44 To recover under this approach, the plaintiff
must illustrate that the doctor's negligence cost the patient a "sub-
stantial chance" of survival.45 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
utilized this approach in Jeanes v. Milner.46 In Jeanes, the patient's
cancer was misdiagnosed as a throat infection. As a direct result, the
cancer became systemic, and the patient subsequently died. If the
cancer had been timely treated, there would have been a 35% chance
of survival. Although the court recognized that medicine is an inexact
science and that causation cannot be proved by a medical certainty,47
36. Id. at 132.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 137.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Joseph H. King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353, 1378 (1981)).
41. King, supra note 9, at 1372-73.
42. Id. at 1376-82.
43. Boggs, supra note 29, at 438.
44. Patricia L. Andel, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the Loss of a
Chance of Survival, 12 PEPP. L. REv. 973, 982 (1985).
45. See Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
46. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 604.
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it nevertheless held that the question of causation was for the jury
even though the chance of survival was less than 50%.48
The general tort law concern for compensating an individual who
has been wrongly injured by the negligence of another is reflected in
the substantial chance approach.49 By assigning a value to chance,5O
courts attempt to rectify the inequity of the all-or-nothing approach,
which allows recovery if the original chance of survival was 51%, but
denies recovery to all plaintiffs not meeting this threshold.51
Although this approach addresses the general tort concern for com-
pensation, most jurisdictions decline to adopt it because it requires
"tampering with the standard of proof."5 2 Rather than focusing on the
patient's loss of chance due to the doctor's negligence, this approach
incorrectly focuses on death as the injury to be compensated.5 3 As
noted earlier, under the all-or-nothing approach, the standard for cau-
sation is that it is more likely than not that death is the compensable
injury. 54 Therefore, this approach allows recovery only by adjusting
the burden of proof away from a preponderance of the evidence as
traditional tort law requires.55 It is the loss of chance of a prolonged
life that should be compensated, not the unfavorable result itself.56
Therefore, due to this "fundamental flaw" in the all-or-nothing ap-
proach, courts have chosen to apply the King or other similar
approaches.57
3. Restatement (Second) of Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323(a) represents the
final alternative for recovery in loss of chance cases. This approach,
like the substantial chance approach, relaxes the standard of proof.5 8
Section 323(a) provides that
[olne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
48. Id. at 605.
49. Boggs, supra note 29, at 431.
50. Fox, supra note 24, at 100.
51. Boggs, supra note 29, at 431.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 432 (quoting Joseph H. King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE
L.J. 1353, 1364 (1981)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Howard Ross Feldman, Comment, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for
the Loss of Chance and Increased Risk, 17 U. BALT. L. REv. 139, 145-46 (1987).
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exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if. (a) his failure to exer-
cise such care increases the risk of such harm.
59
Under this approach, the doctor is liable for the harm caused to a pa-
tient if the care rendered increases the risk of harm.60 Therefore, if
the doctor's negligence is a substantial factor in causing the patient's
harm, then the doctor is liable.61
Ohio most recently adopted the Restatement approach, overturn-
ing a twenty-five year precedent of applying the all-or-nothing ap-
proach to loss of chance cases. In Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Medical
Group, Inc.,62 the decedent's lung cancer was neither timely diag-
nosed nor treated by the defendant.63 A wrongful death action was
brought by the plaintiff, executor of the decedent's estate, alleging the
defendant was negligent in failing to properly diagnose the decedent's
lung cancer for seventeen months.6 4
Prior to trial, expert testimony established that even with proper
and timely diagnosis, the decedent's chance of survival would have
been only 28%.65 Following Ohio precedent,6 6 the trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment since the plaintiff did
not establish that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause
of the decedent's death.67
On appeal, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, recogniz-
ing loss of chance as a cause of action under the Restatement ap-
proach. In overturning its own twenty-five year precedent, the Ohio
Supreme Court reasoned that
[t]he time has come to discard the traditionally harsh view we previously fol-
lowed and to join the majority of states that have adopted the loss of chance
theory. A patient who seeks medical assistance from a professional caregiver
has the right to expect proper care and should be compensated for any injury
caused by the caregiver's negligence which has reduced his or her chance of
survival. 6 8
Therefore, once the plaintiff demonstrates through expert testimony
that the defendant's negligence increased the risk of harm to the pa-
tient, then "it then becomes a jury question as to whether the defend-
ant's negligence was a cause of the plaintiffs injury or death."69
59. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965).
60. Fox, supra note 24, at 100.
61. Id.
62. 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996).
63. Id. at 481.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by
Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996).
67. Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 481 (Ohio 1996).
68. Id. at 484.
69. Id.
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Although this approach to loss of chance cases attempts to compen-
sate for the patient's increased risk of harm, damage awards are not
adjusted to reflect only the percentage of harm actually caused by the
doctor's negligence. 70 Thus, it is similar to the all-or-nothing ap-
proach because it allows 100% recovery and thereby overcompensates
the plaintiff.7 1 It differs from the King approach by altering the stan-
dard of proof for causation,7 2 and it differs from the substantial chance
approach by allowing any percentage of loss to be submitted to the
jury.73 One commentator has noted that "[clases applying section
323(a) employ language from all of the other approaches, so, in its es-
sence, it is a hybrid of all the other approaches and not a very good
one."
7 4
III. NEBRASKA COMMON LAW
Although loss of chance of survival is widely accepted in other ju-
risdictions,7 5 Nebraska has yet to adopt it explicitly as a cause of ac-
tion. Nonetheless, the court will implicitly support loss of chance
given reasonable medical certainty that damages were caused by the
alleged negligence.7 6 Yet, even if the Nebraska Supreme Court im-
plicitly supports the adoption of loss of chance, it is uncertain which
approach the court will choose to adopt.
A. Recognizing Loss of Chance in Nebraska
Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc.7 7 emits strong support for
adopting loss of chance either as a cause of action or as an element of
tort damages. In Steineke, the plaintiff had an ectopic pregnancy.
78
Her health care provider insisted she have the necessary emergency
surgery at a different hospital than the one where she was admitted.
If Steineke had chosen to remain at the first hospital, she would have
been responsible for the cost of her care. After transferring to the sec-
70. Boggs, supra note 29, at 433. See also Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan.
1994)(stating that the valuation approach for calculating loss of chance damages
lacks precision). But see Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668
N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996)(adopting the Restatement approach for causa-
tion, but adopting the King approach for calculating damages).
71. Boggs, supra note 29, at 441.
72. Donna H. Smith, Note, Increased Risk of Harm: A New Standard For Sufficiency
of Evidence of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U. L. Rav. 275
(1985).
73. Boggs, supra note 29, at 433.
74. Id.
75. See cases cited supra note 4.
76. See Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 518 N.W.2d 904 (1994).
77. Id.
78. An ectopic pregnancy is one in which a fertilized ovum develops outside the uter-
ine cavity. Id. at 376, 518 N.W.2d at 906.
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ond hospital, the plaintiff was told that the doctors would be unable to
save either the fetus or her fallopian tube because "that procedure"
was not done there. In contrast, the first hospital did perform the nec-
essary procedure to possibly save the tube and fetus. Steineke signed
a written consent at the second hospital acknowledging that neither
her fetus nor her remaining fallopian tube could be saved.
Steineke sued her provider for the lost chance of fertility due to the
lost tube. Steineke argued her loss of chance to keep her only remain-
ing fallopian tube and her loss of chance to conceive and bear children
was a direct result of her provider's overriding judgment to have her
moved to the second facility.79 The court rejected the loss of chance
doctrine because Steineke "cited no authority, nor [has this court] dis-
covered any, that Nebraska recognizes loss of chance as a cause of ac-
tion or as an element of damages in either tort or contract cases."80
Although the majority opinion explicitly declined to adopt the loss
of chance doctrine in Steineke,S1 the dissent cited Washington v. Amer-
ican Community Stores Corp.,82 a Nebraska case recognizing the loss
of chance doctrine as a element of tort damages.8 3 In Washington,S4
the plaintiff, a twenty-four-year-old parole officer, was involved in a
car collision and brought a personal injury suit claiming that his inju-
ries prevented him from pursuing a wrestling career. Expert testi-
mony indicated that prior to the injury Washington was a prime
candidate for the United States Olympic team and had the potential to
win a medal and become a great international wrestler.8 5 Evidence
suggested that those who compete in the Olympics and win a medal
have a better opportunity to become a coach or professional wrestler.
The court permitted recovery for the loss of chance, rejecting the argu-
ment that the claim of damages was speculative and conjectural be-
cause it rested on uncertain future possibilities and uncertain future
happenings.S6 Based on this decision, Judge Caporale concluded that
Nebraska precedent supported recognizing loss of chance as an ele-
ment of tort damages.8 7
In addition, the Steineke court looked to principles of contract law
to determine whether the provider's alleged breach of contract was a
79. Id. at 378, 518 N.W.2d at 907.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 196 Neb. 624, 244 N.W.2d 286 (1976).
83. Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 381, 518 N.W.2d 904, 908
(1994)(Caporale, J., dissenting).
84. Washington v. American Community Stores Corp., 196 Neb. 624, 244 N.W.2d 286
(1976).
85. Id. at 627, 244 N.W.2d at 288.
86. Id. at 629, 244 N.W.2d at 289.
87. Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 381, 518 N.W.2d 904, 909
(1994)(Caporale, J., dissenting).
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proximate cause of Steineke's alleged damages.8 8 Steineke's expert
medical witness testified in his deposition that there would have been
a better chance of saving her fallopian tube had the plaintiff been
treated at the first hospital.8 9 Because medical opinions must be
based on reasonable medical certainty,9 0 the court found the expert's
testimony "couched in terms of 'possibility,"'91 and therefore "insuffi-
cient to support a causal relationship."9 2 The court concluded that be-
cause Steineke failed to show "to a reasonable medical certainty that
her alleged damages were proximately caused by [the provider's] al-
leged breach... Steineke has failed in her burden to present evidence
creating an issue of material fact . . . ."93 Therefore, by considering
whether Steineke had established a causal connection between the
provider's breach and her alleged loss of the chance to conceive, loss of
chance is necessarily recognized in the majority opinion.9 4 Indeed,
this analysis led Chief Justice White in his concurring opinion to
agree with the court's decision.9 5 He concluded, however, that "[tihe
opinion is inconsistent with its summary declaration that this juris-
diction will not recognize loss of chance as a cause of action or an ele-
ment of damages in either contract or tort cases."96
Moreover, the majority of the Steineke court did recognize loss of
chance as an element of tort damages in Nebraska. First, in concur-
ring, Chief Justice White, joined by Judge Wright, unequivocally rec-
ognized the loss of chance doctrine "to the extent that it would allow
recovery for the loss of chance to conceive." 97 Second, Judge Caporale,
who was joined by Judge Lanphier in dissent, cited precedent that the
Nebraska Supreme Court already recognized loss of chance as an ele-
ment of tort damages9 S Thus, four of seven members of the Nebraska
Supreme Court recognized loss of chance in Nebraska.9 9 It is impor-
tant to note, however, that all three remaining judges in the majority
have since left the court, and it remains uncertain where the new
judges stand on this issue.
88. Id. at 378-80, 518 N.W.2d at 907-08.
89. Id. at 379, 518 N.W.2d at 907.
90. Id. See also Caradori v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 213 Neb. 513, 517, 329 N.W.2d
865, 867 (1983).
91. Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 379, 518 N.W.2d 904, 907
(1994).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 379, 518 N.W.2d at 908.
94. Id. at 380, 518 N.W.2d at 908 (White, J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 381, 518 N.W.2d at 909.
99. Chief Justice Hastings, Judge Fahrnbruch, and Judge Boslaugh have since left
the court.
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B. Future of Loss of Chance in Nebraska
To the extent the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized loss of
chance, Steineke is useful because it opens the door for future loss of
chance litigation. Yet, because Steineke was unable to establish to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that her fallopian tube could
have been saved had she remained at the first hospital, the court did
not have to address how loss of chance would be applied in future
cases. To this extent, Steineke leaves much room for speculation. Will
the court adopt loss of chance doctrine as a separate cause of action or
leave it as an element of tort damages that would require loss of
chance to be preceded by some other tangible, physical injury?
Whatever the court decides in the future as to this issue, it also is
uncertain whether the court will join the recent trend and adopt the
King approach or whether it will follow the decreasing majority and
adopt the all-or-nothing approach to determine the outcome in loss of
chance cases. The court's strict adherence to the reasonable medical
certainty standard, however, strongly suggests that the substantial
chance and the Restatement approaches to loss of chance will not be
adopted because each requires tinkering with the standard of proof.loo
The concurring opinion recognized the loss of chance doctrine as a
cause of action,101 but noted that Steineke's inability to establish to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that her fallopian tube could
have been saved but for the provider's breach eliminated her right to
recover for her loss of chance.10 2 This requires some explanation. Ob-
viously, for Steineke's loss of chance to be actionable, she must have
had an initial chance to conceive. Among other things, a chance to
conceive requires a functional fallopian tube. Steineke's loss of chance
to conceive was predicated on her ability to establish that her fallo-
pian tube more likely than not could have been saved but for the pro-
vider's breach. If Steineke had established to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that her fallopian tube could have been saved by
remaining at the first hospital, she would have had an initial chance
to conceive, and her loss of chance claim would have been actionable.
To allow Steineke to recover for her loss of chance without establish-
ing an initial chance to conceive would produce a windfall to the plain-
tiff and thus strain the traditional tort principle of returning parties to
status quo.
To recover for loss of chance as a tort action, the plaintiff need
prove only that the doctor is a proximate cause of the loss of chance.103
If the plaintiff can establish to a reasonable medical certainty a causal
100. Boggs, supra note 29, at 432.
101. Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 380, 518 N.W.2d 904, 908
(1994)(White, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. King, supra note 9, at 1376-82.
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connection between the doctor's negligence and the patient's loss of
chance, the plaintiff meets the burden of proof and will recover dam-
ages. This recovery occurs regardless of the patient's initial chance of
avoiding harm.
As the dissent illustrated, Nebraska previously has recognized loss
of chance as an element of tort damages.' 0 4 Uncertainty arises be-
cause the opinion does not comment on the how the standard of rea-
sonable medical certainty would be applied. Whether the standard is
applied within the framework of the all-or-nothing approach or the
King approach definitely will affect the number of plaintiffs able to
recover, as well as the amount recoverable.
To better illustrate, assume Steineke could establish to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty that her fallopian tube could have
been saved but for the provider's breach. Additionally, through expert
medical testimony, assume Steineke could establish that her chance to
conceive had decreased from 50% to 0% as a direct result of the de-
stroyed fallopian tube. Based on this evidence, Steineke could prove
the provider was the proximate cause of the loss of chance and was
responsible for at least 51% of the 50% loss. Because Steineke's initial
chance to conceive was only 50% prior to the provider's breach, her
damage recovery would be determined by the court's application of the
reasonable medical certainty standard. If the standard is applied to
the patient's initial chance to conceive, the patient could be denied
recovery even though the doctor's negligence resulted in a 50% loss of
chance. In this case, there is no cause of action because it was not
more likely that the patient would have conceived but for the doctor's
negligence. Conversely, if the standard is applied to the loss of chance
itself, Steineke would recover because there was reasonable medical
certainty as to the 50% loss of chance. In other words, judicial adop-
tion of the all-or-nothing approach would lead to no recovery for
Steineke for her loss of chance to conceive. Yet, by recognizing the
King approach to loss of chance, Steineke would recover for the 50%
reduction in her chance to conceive.
IV. ARGUMENTS OF POLICY
Although Steineke recognized adopting loss of chance either as a
tort action or as an element of tort damages, the Nebraska Supreme
Court does not specify the approach it will apply in future cases. Be-
cause only three judges joined on this issue, in future cases the court
is free and may be persuaded to follow the movement of the majority
of jurisdictions adopting loss of chance as an actionable tort. Attor-
neys then will be in a position to make policy arguments to influence
104. Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 381, 518 N.W.2d 904, 909
(1994)(Caporale, J., dissenting).
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the approach the Nebraska Supreme Court ultimately adopts. Before
focusing on potential policy considerations, it is important to address
the valuation of damages under each approach to loss of chance. Dam-
ages are a necessary element to any tort action and their valuation
will be useful in formulating policy arguments.
A. Damage Award Valuation
The final element in any negligence claim, including medical mal-
practice, is damages.' 0 5 There are only two logical approaches to
damage awards in loss of chance cases.
The first approach to awarding damages is to award full compensa-
tion without regard to the actual loss of chance.' 0 6 This approach,
embraced by the all-or-nothing, substantial chance, and the Restate-
ment approaches, results in gross inequities.' 0 7 First, it is too burden-
some for doctors who are forced to compensate plaintiffs for the
percentage of harm their negligence did not cause and that may have
occurred despite the doctor's conduct. 0 8 As a result, plaintiffs receive
windfalls in compensation.
The second approach to damages is to compensate plaintiffs for
their actual loss of chance.' 0 9 This method, embraced by the King ap-
proach, is both consistent and fair and avoids the inequities of the first
approach."l 0 Simply put, compensation is determined by multiplying
the value of life without the harm by the percentage of chance lost."'
To illustrate the different approaches, consider the following exam-
ple. A patient's initial chance of survival with timely diagnosis of the
cancer was 55%. Several experts agreed that the delay in diagnosing
the patient's cancer was critical and most certainly resulted in a 20%
loss of chance of survival. If the jury believes the plaintiffs expert
testimony and values the patient's life at $3 million, under the first
approach the doctor is liable for $3 million even though the doctor's
negligence caused only a 20% loss of chance. On the other hand, if the
compensation is awarded for only the actual loss of chance, the negli-
105. Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989).
106. Id.
107. Id. See also Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz.
1984).
108. Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1466.
111. Id. This approach, the percentage apportionment of damages method, has been
followed by many courts. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476,
1482-83 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986); DeBurkarte v.
Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med.
Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996); McKellips v. Saint Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476 nn.25-26 (Okla. 1987); Herskovits v. Group Health
Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 487 (Wash. 1983)(Pearson, J., concurring).
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gent doctor is liable for $600,000-the value of life multiplied by the
percentage of chance lost. Therefore, an application of the first ap-
proach to damage awards places an unfair burden on the doctor, and
yields to the plaintiff a windfall in compensation equal to $2.4 million.
B. Policy Considerations
In loss of chance actions, if a doctor fails to meet the requisite stan-
dard of care demanded by the law, she can be held liable.112 This lia-
bility merely shifts the losses sustained by the person who is injured
to the one who caused the harm,113 i.e., returning the injured party to
status quo. Because any loss of chance makes a person worse off, this
general premise of tort liability calls for the compensation of this loss
regardless of the patient's initial loss of chance.
Patients deserve reasonable medical care regardless of whether or
not their initial chance of survival was greater than 50%.114 If a doc-
tor fails to provide the best medical care, and a patient's chance of
survival declines as a result, then the doctor should be unable to avoid
liability because the patient's chance of survival was less than 51%.
As the Kansas Supreme Court stated,
[t]he reasoning of the district court herein [which rejected loss of chance as a
cognizable tort] ... in essence, declares open season on critically ill or injured
persons as care providers would be free of liability for even the grossest mal-
practice if the patient had only a fifty-fifty chance of surviving the disease or
injury even with proper treatment.
1 1 5
Professor King also has provided policy reasons for recognizing loss
of chance, noting that the all-or-nothing approach "subverts the deter-
rent objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of con-
duct that causes statistically demonstrable losses."116 In other words,
the all or nothing approach creates an incentive for a doctor to breach
his duty of care to the patient whose chance of survival is less than
51%. Obviously, this assumes that a doctor knows which patients
have a less than 51% chance of survival.1 ' 7 Even so, one commentator
noted that the increased risk of tort liability alone would act as "a
useful spur to the medical community to exercise due care in the diag-
nosis and treatment of typically fatal diseases and conditions."1 18
112. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 239
(1944).
113. Id. at 238.
114. See Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996).
115. Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 160 (Kan. 1984), overruled by Delaney v.
Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994).
116. King, supra note 9, at 1377.
117. Boggs, supra note 29, at 440.
118. Warner Miller, Note, Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative: Negligent Crea-
tion of a Substantial Risk of Injury is a Compensable Harm, 9 U. PUGET SoUND L.
REV. 251, 254-55 (1985).
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The King approach may substantially affect a doctor's examination
of a patient.119 Advocates assert that adopting this approach will lead
to better quality of patient care. 120 Critics, however, assert that the
King approach would lead only to defensive medicine, which leads to
increased cost of medical treatment.121 The concern is that defensive
medicine is contrary to the current climate of cost containment in
medical care. 122 In retort, as the quality and efficiency of medical care
are enhanced by the deterrence proffered by the King approach, insur-
ance costs are likely to be reduced.123 Therefore, the overall cost of
medical care could remain constant.124
An additional concern with the King approach is that it may lead
to an increase in liability for doctors,125 causing the overall cost of
medical care to increase.126 While application of the King approach
may cause the overall number of lawsuits and plaintiff verdicts to in-
crease, as the number of potential plaintiffs rises, the amount of each
award will reflect only the loss of chance caused by the negligence.12 7
As a result, the reduction in damage awards to plaintiffs who once had
viable causes of action under the all-or-nothing approach should offset
the additionaljudgments.128 In fact, some have argued that incidents
of medical malpractice would decrease because doctors would have the
incentive to more carefully treat patients.' 29 If this is true, the overall
cost to doctors actually would decrease.' 30 In reality, however,
"[riecognizing loss of a chance may or may not affect the costs of medi-
119. Boggs, supra note 29, at 441.
120. King, supra note 9, at 1377.
121. Lisa Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding Medical
Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INs. L.J. 615, 625 (1992).
122. Id.
123. RicHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14, at 186-87 (1986).
124. Feldman, supra note 58, at 150-51. The amount of increased medical care by
doctors will also lead to a more efficient result as precautions will increase only to
the point were the cost of the increase in care equals the benefit of avoiding liabil-
ity. See POsNER, supra note 123, § 6.1.
125. Boggs, supra note 29, at 442.
126. See generally Perrochet et al., supra note 121.
127. Id. When the patient's chance of survival is reduced from 45% to 25%, the plain-
tiff will receive only 20% of the value of the decedent's life. Feldman, supra note
58, at 155.
128. Boggs, supra note 29, at 442. In the all-or-nothing approach of traditional tort
law, the plaintiff who can prove the patient's initial chances of survival is greater
than 50%, the plaintiff will recover 100% of the value of damages even though the
plaintiff could not prove to a 100% degree of certainty that the doctor caused the
death of the patient. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 1990).
Professor King finds the inequity "as questionable as the extreme reached when
the all-or-nothing concept denies any redress for the destruction of a not-better-
than-even chance." King, supra note 9, at 1387.
129. Feldman, supra note 58, at 151.
130. Kevin Joseph Willging, Note, Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A Rational Approach
to Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions, 9 J. CoNTEmP. HEATH L. & PoL'y 545, 560 (1993).
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cal care. While impressive statistics can be marshalled by both sup-
porters and opponents of the rule, it seems impossible to conclusively
determine the impact of loss of a chance upon medical care costs."1Si
Courts' strongest opposition to adopting loss of chance is fear that
excessive use of statistics and probabilities offered by both sides would
confuse a jury and lead to an unworkable system for medical malprac-
tice jurisprudence.132 In response to this concern, it should be recog-
nized that similar use of statistics and probabilities often are used
under traditional tort rules,133 such as determining contribution in
comparative fault situations, apportioning damages in products liabil-
ity suits, and evaluating life expectancy in wrongful death actions. 134
The use of statistics is essential if loss of chance is to be deemed a
compensable interest; the alternatives, which include providing no
guidance to the trier of fact or retaining the all or nothing ap-
proach, 13 5 should be avoided by courts' 3 6 precisely because the essen-
tial role of statistical evidence is not addressed when applying
traditional principles of tort law. Besides, science is capable of valu-
ing loss of chancel 37 and therefore use of scientific evidence is
feasible.13s
In addition, recognizing loss of chance as a protected interest may
best serve public policy.13 9 If a patient's life can be prolonged by
proper medical treatment, the patient's opportunity to benefit from fu-
ture medical breakthroughs and this may further extend the patient's
life.140 Ignoring this potential, as the all or nothing approach contem-
plates, is contrary to the purpose and goal of tort law.141 Allowing loss
of chance to be actionable even if such chance is not better than 50%
places this cause of action squarely within the boundaries of tradi-
tional tort cases.14 2 Failing to recognize loss of chance as a compensa-
131. Bruer, supra note 5, at 991. Professor Bruer argues, however, that if it is as-
sumed that the same number of potential plaintiffs are on either side of the 51%
threshold, then doctors will be liable for the same amount of damages under
either rule. Id. Thus, loss of chance merely permits more plaintiffs to recover
without any additional liability for doctors. Id.
132. See, e.g., Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213-14 (Md.
1990).
133. King, supra note 9, at 1385.
134. Smith, supra note 72, at 312.
135. Id.
136. King, supra note 9, at 1385.
137. Id. at 1387.
138. Id.
139. Feldman, supra note 58, at 150.
140. King, supra note 9, at 1373.
141. Id. at 1377.
142. Id. at 1376.
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ble interest "distorts the loss-assigning role" of tort law and "strikes at
the integrity of the torts system of loss allocation."'1
43
As between the loss of chance approaches discussed above, the
King approach is more equitable than the relaxed standard of proof
method of the substantial chance and the Restatement approaches.
Unlike the King approach, the relaxed standard of proof can cause
confusion' 44 and lead to overcompensating the plaintiff for the plain-
tiffs harm.14 5 Moreover, the King approach does not require tinker-
ing with the traditional concepts of tort law.'
4 6
V. CONCLUSION
Herbie Husker awaits your legal analysis of his situation and your
advice. Nebraska law, more specifically Steineke v. Share Health
Plan, Inc., appears to support adopting loss of chance either as a cause
of action or an element of tort damages. If the Nebraska Supreme
Court chooses loss of chance as a separate cause of action, Herbie will
recover because he needs to prove only that his doctor was the proxi-
mate cause of his loss of chance of survival. But, if the Court adopts
loss of chance only as element of tort damages, Herbie will not recover
because his loss of chance of survival was not preceded by a tangible,
physical injury that resulted from his doctor's negligence.
Does Herbie Husker have a right to the same quality of care re-
gardless of his initial chance to recover? If so, he deserves to have a
legal remedy for the violation of that right. By recognizing loss of
chance as a separate cause of action under the King approach, the
Nebraska Supreme Court merely would provide a remedy for negli-
gent medical treatment. The King approach acknowledges that any
loss of chance is a compensable injury regardless of the initial chance
of avoiding harm. By recognizing the King approach to loss of chance,
this court can (1) create an incentive that will lead to better patient
care, thereby prolonging patient life; (2) reduce the number of law-
suits, as doctors conform to their professional standard of care; and (3)
lower damage awards to reflect only the amount of chance lost. Addi-
tionally, the loss of chance cause of action does not lower the standard
of proof, and so comports with the requirements of proof and causation
in Nebraska. Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court should adopt
loss of chance as a separate cause of action to avoid an all-or-nothing
approach that is contrary to the purpose and goal of tort law. By
adopting loss of chance as a separate cause of action, doctors are asked
only to not breach their professional standard of care.
143. Id. at 1377.
144. Boggs, supra note 29, at 436.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 432.
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During the next few years, Nebraska medical malpractice attor-
neys will play a key role in molding the future of loss of chance in
Nebraska. Therefore, Herbie's ability to recover damages will depend
on the strength of representation, more specifically the ability to advo-
cate the benefits of adopting loss of chance as a separate cause of ac-
tion in Nebraska.
Patrick L. Evatt '98
